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Abstract: This paper investigates the relative cyclical behavior of the pay of piece 
workers and hourly paid workers. It uses a unique data set of blue-collar workers in 
British engineering between 1926 and 1966.  The statistics are obtained from the 
payrolls of firms belonging to the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF).  
Roughly, the EEF accounted for one-third of the total engineering workforce.  The 
data consist of cell averages delineated by 15 occupations in 29 engineering districts. 
Via a firm-union bargaining modelling structure, the question is examined as to likely 
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labor markets. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades researchers have found evidence of strong wage 
procyclicality.  In most cases, this has been measured in terms of wage - unemployment 
trade-offs.1  But the picture is not clear cut.  Based on U.S. data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), Devereux (2001) finds relatively modest overall wage 
procyclicality.  His study differentiates among salaried and hourly paid workers as well 
as workers whose pay is directly related to current output.  Forms of remuneration for this 
last group comprise "piece rates, commissions, tips, and in other ways".  Hourly earnings 
linked directly to current output (such as piece rates) are found by Devereux to be 
significantly more procyclical than those of hourly paid or salaried workers. However,  
the group of individuals receiving piece rates/commissions etc. in the PSID is relatively 
small and so Devereux is very cautious about this relative finding. 
Since output-related pay is likely to correlate positively with productivity and 
product demand, we might expect a priori an especially strong positive association 
between piece rate pay and the level of business activity.  This paper attempts to examine 
the question of cyclical movements in incentive pay and time-related pay in more depth. 
It concentrates on the two types of remuneration of blue collar workers in the British 
engineering industry between 1926 and 1966.  These are earnings based on piece rates 
and on hourly rates.  Data are compiled from the annual payroll records of the 
Engineering Employers Federation (EEF).  In the early 1950s, total engineering 
                                                 
1 Following the study of Bils (1985), empirical research has been dominated by the use of individual-level 
panels.  Findings of strong cyclicality include Solon et al. (1994) and Shin (1994) for the United States, 
Bellmann and Blien (2001) for Germany, Devereux and Hart (2006) and Hart (2006) for the U.K. While 
inevitable caveats arise in these studies, they are all reasonably consistent with an emerging stylized fact 
that a one point increase in the rate of unemployment is associated with a one percent decrease in the wage.   
    
 
 3
employment accounted for about one seventh of Britain’s working population (Knowles 
and Hill, 1954).  Federated engineering firms accounted for about one-third of this total. 
The payroll statistics used here cover roughly 40 percent of the EEF employment. They 
consist of cell averages of 15 engineering occupational groups within 29 engineering 
geographical districts over a 40-year time span. Matching district unemployment rates are 
also available.  
The engineering industry in general and, especially, the EEF were heavily 
unionized.  Accordingly, the paper starts by investigating piece-and hours-related pay 
reactions to price or productivity shocks within a firm-union bargaining framework.  
Linked to modeling outcomes, pay cyclicality is subsequently tested under two 
unemployment regimes.  In tight post-war labor markets, with relatively little short-term 
scope to change the size of the firm’s employment stock, significant increases in 
production are more likely to stem from increases in the hours and effort of existing 
workers. Earnings increases directly rewarded existing employees for this greater work 
intensity as well as compensating them for increased work disutility.  In slack pre-war 
market conditions, changes in union utility was strongly influenced by rises and falls in 
employed union membership with earnings’ effects becoming less clear cut.    
The EEF data offer a number of comparative empirical advantages.  First, they 
contain large samples of both piece-rate and hourly paid workers and so provide serious 
insights into cyclicality by these two radically different payment methods.  Second, by 
straddling the period of the Great Depression, they enable us to obtain evidence derived 
from the most pronounced and unequivocal business cycle.  Third, they cover a fairly 
homogeneous group of workers so that any observed differences by method of pay are 
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less likely to be spuriously caused by differences in worker characteristics. Fourth, unlike 
earlier studies that examine pre-war wage cyclicality, the data permit the use of modern 
micro methods to study cyclicality.  This enables comparison with findings of studies 
using more recent data.  Fifth, hours’ fluctuations, and associated variations in the 
importance of overtime pay, are important features of engineering blue collar jobs and so 
the data helps cast a sharp light on the role of working time in earnings cycles (see 
Abowd and Card, 1989, Devereux, 2001, Shin and Solon, 2004).  Sixth, the data offer a 
stringent test of whether the common finding of strong wage procyclicality is time 
invariant or just relevant to recent decades.  For example, on the basis of industry-level 
data for the U.S., Bernanke and Powell (1986) find that post-war wage procyclicality 
contrasts, typically, with countercyclical real wages in the pre-war period (see also 
Bernanke, 1986).   
Section 2 outlines firm-union bargaining outcomes under piece- and time- related 
payment systems.  Section 3 contains a description and discussion of EEF and related 
data.  Section 4 lays out the approach to estimating pay – unemployment cyclicality.  
Results are presented in Section 5.  Brief conclusions are drawn-up in Section 6.  
 
2 Payment methods, firm-union bargaining, and price shocks 
Union agreements formed an important part of pay settlements within EEF 
member firms. Discussion here focuses on a firm-union bargaining agenda that includes 
pay (either piece- or time- related), work intensity (defined by hours and effort), and 
employment.  Embracing both pay and work intensity also reflects the framework of most 
of the empirical cyclical pay literature listed in the introduction (see Foonote 1).  During 
the study period, engineering unions cared not only about pay and other internal work 
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conditions but also about the proportion union members who were employed.2  I focus on 
piece- and time-rate reactions to price shocks within an efficient bargaining framework.      
Consider an engineering firm that produces homogeneous output, Q, and chooses 
to operate under either a piece rate system or an hourly pay system. 3  Workers belong to 
a single union.  The union also represents outside unemployed workers.  It is assumed 
that the union is risk neutral.  
The firm’s production function is given by 
(1)  Q = F(N, h, e)  Fi > 0, Fii < 0 
  
where N is the workforce, h is average hours, and e is average work effort. 
The firm’s profit is given by4 
 
(2)  π = pQ – (YJ – z)N   (J = P,H) 
 
where p is product price, Y is earnings, z is the per-worker cost of monitoring 
performance, with earnings relating either to a piece rate system (P) or an hourly pay 
system (H).  For simplicity, I assume fixed and predetermined per-worker expenditures 
by the firm on monitoring. 
How are the two payments methods differentiated?   
                                                 
2 This was especially true of the Great Depression when up to one-quarter of the entire engineering 
workforce was unemployed.  
 
3 The simplification of assuming that the firm wholly employs piece rate or hourly paid workers is not too 
unreasonable a restriction in the context of the EEF data used in the subsequent empircal analyis.  Hill and 
Knowles (1956) were able to obtain individual firm data from the EEF for 1952.  They found that fitters 
were paid exclusively by time rates in 60 percent of firms, exclusively by piece rate in 17 percent, and by a 
mixture the two payment methods in the remainder.   
 
4 To simplify the notation, I differentiate between the two payment systems by suffixing earnings without 
indicating that the respective output, profits, and fixed costs are likely to differ. 
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Following Pencavel (1977), let the output or performance of a piece rate worker 
be indexed by Φ.  Let the level of Φ be determined by the number of hours worked and 
the effort expended on that work.  Then we may express piece-related earnings as 
  
(3)  YP = τΦ(e, h)   
  
where τ is the piece rate. 
Earnings based on paid-for hours may be expressed simply as  
(4) YH  = yHh 
where yH  is hourly wage earnings. With no overtime, yH = w where w is the basic wage 
rate.  With overtime yH = whs + kw(h -hs) where hs is maximum basic weekly hours and k 
(>1) is the overtime premium.  Where overtime is worked, an increase in h for given hs, w 
and k will increase YH.   
The essential differences between the piece rate and hourly pay set-ups relate to 
the definition and treatment of effort, e.  Most obviously, e directly affects earnings of 
pieceworkers but not timeworkers.5  Piece work earnings relate to current output (see 
Lazear, 1986) with the latter implicitly assumed here to be a function of work application 
or effort.  So, for given h and τ in (3), a pieceworker can earn more one week compared 
to another week by increasing current output and/or by ensuring that a larger proportion 
of output achieves a laid-down quality standard.  By contrast, the hourly pay of a time 
worker is typically fixed by a short term contractual agreement. Of course, productive 
effort may vary and impact on output – as expressed in equation (1) - in a time work firm. 
For example, shirking is a potential problem among hourly paid workers. Essentially, 
                                                 
5 Although it can indirectly affect the remuneration of both groups due to rent sharing via productive 
activity. 
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therefore, monitoring costs related to productive performance (i.e. the z’s in (2)) have 
different areas of emphasis under the two payment systems.  As stated by Pencavel 
(1977), “supervisory personnel are used to reduce shirking by workers on time-rates 
while with payment-by-results systems more resources are devoted to inspect the quality 
of output….”       
The trade union has M members of whom M – N are unemployed and receive b 
unemployment benefit.  The union’s objective function is given by  
 
(5) V = N{u(YJ)  – d(e, h)} + (M – N)u(b)  
where we assume that a worker’s disutility is separable in income and the disutility of 
work, with d(e, h) representing the latter.  We assume that di > 0 and dii > 0.  If 
bargaining breaks down, utility at the threat point is U = Mu(b).  The assumption of risk 
neutrality implies .0 and0 =′′>′ uu  
The union’s rent is R = V – U.  The risk assumption allows us to express rent 
simply in terms of net income.  Thus 
  
(6)    }.),({ bhedYNR J −−=  
The generalised Nash bargain is given by 
 
(7)   ααπ )()(max 1
,,,
R
JYehN
−=∏  
 
where α is relative union power, with { }1,0∈α .   
From the first-order conditions to the problem in (7), the union’s share of rent is 
given by N{YJ – z - d(·) – b} = {α/(1 – α)}π . Further, we obtain pFN  = {z + d(·)+ b}or 
the parties equate marginal value product and the marginal cost of employment, with d(·) 
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and b representing the opportunity cost of work. On the intensive margins, equilibrium 
requires that (Fh/Fe) = (dh/de), or relative returns and disutilities of hours and effort are 
equated.  
From (6) the union’s rent is increased by a rise in employed membership and/or 
net income. What are the effects of a price, or productivity, shock on these two variables?  
This involves evaluating ./and,/,/,/ pYphpepN J ∂∂∂∂∂∂∂∂   
As an initial simplification, suppose that changes in effort have no effect on 
individual and aggregate output (i.e. 0==Φ ee F  in (3) and (1), respectively). This may 
be a plausible assumption in respect of the work environment of many engineering 
workers. First, the use of automatic machinery may serve to regulate and control the rate 
of work flow. Second, engineering work linked to line production may remove 
individuals’ abilities to influence the rate of production throughput. Third, team work 
may severely restrict individual control of work rate when output stems from 
interdependent inputs across team members.  It should be added, however, that 
discounting effort effects in these ways is a much more plausible assumption in a time 
work compared to a piece work environment. Tightly controlling individuals’ abilities to 
vary output as well as involvement in team-reliant production are operational features 
that detract from the use of piece rate systems (Fama, 1991).6   
Imposing this effort restriction effectively reduces the problem to that of a 
workers-hours efficient bargaining model (see Hart and Moutos, 1995; pp. 119-121).  
Even with this simpler problem, however, it is not possible to sign unambiguously the 
                                                 
6 Also, since time rated work is unlikely to involve close monitoring of current individual output, the firm 
may realistically endeavour to ensure minimum output levels that involve relatively simple and inexpensive 
monitoring procedures (Borjas, 2002).  In this event, it is realistic to confine attention to hours of work as 
the representation of the time-work firm’s intensive margin of operation. 
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reactions of employment or hours or earnings to price changes.    In essence, a positive 
price shock will result in increases in production and profit.  But increased factor input 
may take the form of a rise in employment or hours or both.  The union’s payoff also 
rises, but this can take the form of a rise in employed membership and/or a rise in 
earnings. In fact, a significant rise in one these utility-related variables may accompany a 
fall in the other. 
Retaining the assumption of no association between effort changes and output, 
two additional restrictions do lead to more clear cut outcomes.  First, in respect of (4), let 
hours be fixed at h = hs (and disutility at equivalent d = ds).  The firm and the union may 
have a long-term agreement that workers operate on maximum basic weekly hours.7  The 
modified problem in (7) now yields 0/ >dpdN  and =dpdY J / <> 0.8  A favorable price 
shock induces the firm to increase production which, in this special case, is limited to an 
increase in workforce size.  From (6), the union’s rent is enhanced.  Whether or not the 
union additionally gains through an increase in the wage is not certain.9  Second, suppose 
that employment is fixed at N = N .  Similar developments to the above produce dh/dp > 
                                                 
7 Maximum basic weekly hours where negotiated at national level and applied generally to British 
engineering over the period of study.  Between 1919 and 1946 the basic workweek was 47 hours.  It 
reduced to 44 hours from 1947 to 1959, to 42 hours between 1960 and 1964, and to 40 hours between 1965 
and 1968. 
 
8  Take the example of time payments, with YH = w in (4) and with h = hs = 1 by choice of units. Totally 
differentiating the first-order conditions to this problem yields 0// >∆= NFdpdN N and  =dpdw /  
∆−−−− /})()({ NNsN pFNaFbdwF  <> 0 where .0>−=∆ NNNpF  
 
9 It also holds that dN/db < 0 and dw/db > 0, or a fall in unemployment benefit persuades the union to 
trade-off more employed members at lower pay.  Also we find that dN/dz < 0 while dw/dz <
>  0.  Moreover, 
dN/dα = 0, dw/dα > 0 or a fall in relative union power leaves employment intact (although the firm’s share 
of rent rises) while reducing the wage.  
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0 and dYJ /dp > 0.10  Now, increased production, accompanying a positive price shock, is 
achieved through a rise in average hours.  In this case, increased union utility is 
unequivocally achieved via an increase in the piece rate or the wage rate. 
What if we allow changes in effort to affect individual and aggregate output 
(i.e. 0, >Φ ee F  in (3) and (1), respectively)?  Unsurprisingly, given the foregoing, it is 
not possible to find unambiguous employment, hours and earnings responses to price 
shocks.  An added complication is that both effort and hours appear in the production and 
worker disutility function of piecework and timework firms and, additionally, in the 
earnings function of piecework firms. These two intensive margin variables may act as 
complements or substitutes. In the latter case, for example, a decision to increase hourly 
effort may produce an offsetting leisure reaction, represented by a reduction in the 
number of weekly hours on the job. Gauging relative factor input and earnings responses 
in this case is renderred especially difficult.11  
However, one additional useful insight arises from the complete problem.  The 
possibility that effort and hours act as substitute inputs to price shocks underscores the 
usefulness of empirically measuring pay responses to changes in demand in terms both of 
hourly and weekly earnings.  Consider the outcome 0/ >∂∂ pY P where YP in (3) is 
defined as the weekly earnings of a pieceworker.   For given τ in (3), two possible 
scenarios are as follows.  Suppose that a positive price shock causes a change in effort 
and a partially offsetting reduction in hours such that weekly earnings increase by a given 
                                                 
10 0// >∆= NFdpdh h  and 0/})()()()({/ >∆⋅−′′⋅+′= hhhJ pFFhdNFhdNFdpdY αα   where 
0))(( >−′′=∆ hhpFhdNN . 
   
11 See the very useful discussion in Pencavel (1977) in relation to a highly related supply-side problem.   
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amount.    Alternatively, consider an equivalent weekly earnings response but this time 
consisting of a positive hours effect with a partial offsetting reduction in effort.  While 
weekly earnings changes are the same, by assumption, the rise in average hourly earnings 
in the first of these scenarios would exceed the rise in the second.  In essence, unobserved 
effort may be associated with different hourly/weekly earnings responses.12 
  
Remarks 
Incorporating hours and effort into the definitions of production, utility and 
remuneration does not lead to clean-cut tractability in modelling outcomes.  
Unambiguous employment and earnings responses require the imposition of rather 
stringent restrictions.  Four points are worth stressing. 
 
(a) In a union bargaining framework, where the union ‘cares’ about the employment 
of its members, it is not possible to establish systematic differences in the 
earnings responses of piece- and time-work firms to price, or productivity, shocks.  
 
(b) Even if we assume that effort is independent of output changes, bargaining over 
employment and hours does not ensure unambiguous earnings responses. 
 
(c) Retaining the effort assumption in (b) and holding employment fixed does 
produce positive earnings responses to price shocks.  A reasonable inference 
follows from this result. Suppose that a positive price shock occurs during tight 
labor market conditions.  For many firms, associated production increases are 
                                                 
12 Distinctions among the hourly wage, earnings divided by hours, and earnings are very important to the 
approaches of Devereux (2001) and Shin and Solon (2004).   
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more likely to derive from increased intensive margin activity.  Such changes, 
may well impact positively on earnings as firms reward longer hours and greater 
effort, including compensating employees for associated rises in work disutility.  
 
(d) Especially in the case of pieceworkers, it is good practice to distinguish between 
hourly earnings and weekly earnings in empirical work since the relationship 
between effort and hours may be such as to render the responses of the two 
variables to differ for given price shocks. 
 
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
Data for this project, conditioned by the availability of district unemployment rates, cover 
the period from 1926 to 1938 and from 1951 to 1966.13  Between 1926 and 1938, the EEF 
represented between 1,800 and 2,200 firms employing between 260,000 and 560,000 
adult manual workers (Wigham, 1973). Between 1951 and 1966, there were between 
4,000 and 4, 700 member firms employing between 1,000,000 and 1,161,000 manual 
workers.  The EEF asked each of its member firms to conduct annual earnings enquiries – 
based on company payrolls and during a specimen week14 – separately for timeworkers 
and pieceworkers.    Data on the two types of payment groups are available for 9 main 
occupations.15  All are used in this study although several are further subdivided by skill 
                                                 
13 There are no wage and hours data for 1957 and 1963.   
 
14  During the inter -war period the specimen week always occurred in October. In the post-war period, the 
data were recorded during March 1958,  May 1952 and  otherwise during one of the months from June to 
October. 
 
15 These are coppersmiths, fitters; machinemen; moulders, patternmakers, platers/riveters/caulkers; sheet 
metal workers; turners, and labourers. The EEF earnings enquiries did not exhaustively cover all 
engineering occupations.  For example, they exclude workers engaged on maintenance and repair.  The 9 
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level, giving 15 occupational groups in total (see Table 1).  Pay data allow for the 
calculation of basic wage rates (i.e. excluding overtime) of hourly paid workers.  Average 
hourly earnings, average weekly earnings as well as average weekly hours are available 
for both hourly paid workers and pieceworkers.  All pay and occupational statistics are 
further broken down by EEF into over 50 engineering geographical districts, many of 
which are travel-to-work areas.  This study makes use of 29 of these (see Table 1), for 
which exactly matched district male unemployment rates are available.16 
 
 
During the study period, collective bargaining over pay and conditions was an 
important aspect of the British engineering industry.  The dominant union was the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) but several smaller unions also negotiated on 
behalf of engineering workers. There is no direct information on the proportion of 
unionized workers in federated firms but it is safe to infer that they were significantly 
more unionized than firms in the (relatively highly unionized17) industry as a whole. 
Wigham (1973, pp 5-8) identifies three basic functions of the Federation that remained 
unchanged throughout the period.  First, it provided collective support in order to protect 
individual firms from being singled out in union actions.  Second, it aimed to preserve the 
                                                                                                                                                 
recorded occupations accounted for between 40 and 50 percent of manual males employed in federated 
firms. 
 
16   The unemployment rates are obtained from Hart and MacKay (1975).  They were constructed to 
coincide with EEF districts by combining data on male unemployment and total insured workers taken 
from the Local Unemployment Index and from other records provided by the Department of Employment. 
   
17 Historical union density data (i.e. actual union membership as a percentage of potential union 
membership) for the industry as a whole (i.e. covering federated and non-federated firms) are available in 
Bain and Price (1980). In the post-war period, the densities were uniformly high, lying between 50 and 57 
percent.  They were considerably lower in the pre-war period, and significantly more counter-cyclical.  
Between 1924 and 1933 they fell from 34 to 24 percent and then rose to 33 percent in 1938. 
 
Table 1 here 
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relative power of employers to make management decisions.  Third,  it helped towards 
conflict resolution in union disputes.  Moreover, EEF membership was skewed  
significantly towards large firms where union membership and participation would be 
expected to be relatively high.18   
The detailed payroll statistics on which estimation here is based were collected for 
the prime purpose of being of direct use in union negotiations. While national level 
bargaining was important – especially in respect of attempting to set minimum pay rates 
in key occupations – final agreed rates were strongly influenced at both district and 
company levels.19  Piece rate pricing was complex and displayed considerable variation 
across this large and heterogeneous industry. Nonetheless, there were attempts at 
establishing relatively simple pricing guidelines.  Based on a worker with 'average 
ability', national agreements established a percentage mark-up that a pieceworker might 
be expected to earn compared with the basic time rate within the same occupation.   
Generally, however, such rules provided no more than weakly enforced 
guidelines.  Piece rate/time rate differentials varied substantially within firms, across 
firms and through time.   
 
                                                 
18 In their detailed analysis of the 1953 EEF returns, Hill and Knowles (1956) show that while 50.7 percent 
of federated firms employed fewer than 100 workers they accounted for only 6.2 percent total employment.  
By contrast, the 1.8 percent of firms that employed over 3000 employees accounted for 27 percent of total 
employment.   
 
19 There were national agreements that determined two key occupational rates – for fitters and laborers.  
These were used to establish relative wages for other occupations.  But there were a multiplicity of district-
and company-level deviations from these national rates in order to accommodate local market conditions. 
As stated by Knowles and Hill (1954): “All rates fixed by national agreement are essentially minima, the 
national-agreed differentials may be disturbed or even inverted by firms paying more than the minima all 
round”.  
 
 15
“Owing to the immense number of different processes and operations in so 
heterogeneous an industry, as well as to the rapidity of technical development, any 
general control over piece-work earnings can be no more than minimal…Pieceworkers’ 
actual earnings depend…on a vast number of particular piecework prices and times.  
These are settled by domestic bargaining and are subject to no national control except 
that implied by the application of the piecework percentage to the basic rate…” 
(Knowles and Hill, 1954, pp. 281 and 284). 
 
 
Estimation is undertaken for the complete period 1926 – 1966 as well as for the 
pre-war (1926 – 1938) and post-war (1951-1966) periods. It is claimed in the previous 
section that cyclical wage behavior may be influenced by the relative tightness of labor 
markets.  In the pre-war period, which straddles the Great Depression, the weighted 
average unemployment rates over the 29 districts used here was 10 percent in 1927, rising 
to 25.5 percent in 1932 before falling to 12.9 in 1938.  In 1931, 14 of the 29 districts 
experienced unemployment rates in excess of 25 percent.  In this year, the highest rate  
was 41.5 percent in Oldham and the lowest was 10 percent in Bedfordshire.  In the post-
war era, no district experienced a rate over 6.5 percent.  The lowest aggregate annual rate 
was 1 percent in 1955 and the highest was 2.9 percent in 1963.  Figure 1 shows the 
(weighted) aggregate rate together with a selection of district rates.  Oldham in the north 
of England suffered particularly severely in the Great Depression while Bedfordshire in 
the south was least affected.  London also fared relatively well while Manchester lay 
quite near to the mean line.  It should be noted, however, that even in the post-war period 
Figure 1 here 
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relative unemployment differences among districts could be high; in many years rates of 
under 1 percent in southern and midland districts contrasted with 3, 4 and 5 percent in the 
most depressed northern districts.  
 
 
Table 1 gives the mean number of workers in each district - piece and time 
workers taken separately over all occupations – with respect to the entire period as well 
as the two sub-periods.  The very large standard deviations are easily explained by a 
representative example.  Thus, within the EEF in 1958 there were 5930 skilled fitters in 
Coventry at one end of the spectrum and 31 fitters in St. Helens at the other. In the 
estimation that follows, all occupations by district with more than 10 workers are 
included.   Table 1 also reveals that, on average, 59 percent of workers over the whole 
period worked under a piece rate system.  Annual breakdowns of these percentages are 
shown in Figure 2 where it can be seen that pieceworkers rose as a group from 51 percent 
in 1926 to a peak of 65 percent in 1948, maintained a plateau to 1958, and then declined 
to 55 percent in 1966. 
Table 1 also shows mean real hourly and weekly earnings changes, reflecting the 
constructions in the subsequent empirical work.  For the whole period, piecework and 
timework average pay changes are very similar.  Comparing the pre- and post-war 
periods, significant pay changes occur in respect of weekly earnings.  For both piecework 
and timework, weekly earnings changes are significantly smaller in the pre-war compared 
to the post-war years.  This reflects in part a lower influence of overtime working in the 
Figure 2 here 
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former period.  In the early 1930s, engineering workers experienced significant short-
time working, especially in the more depressed northern districts.  
What about pay differentials between piece-rated and hourly-rated workers?  To 
investigate this issue, I concentrate on hourly earnings. In common with all related 
studies, the differentials favor pieceworkers. Table 1 shows that, over the complete 
period, the average differential was 25 percent.  However, this declined dramatically 
between the inter- and post-war periods, from respective period averages of 32 to 16 
percent. The differentials exhibited a trend decline from 42 to 15 percent between 1926 
and 1938 before rising to 40 percent at the peak of the war activity in 1942.20  The build 
up to war (starting in 1935) and the early war years almost certainly produced a greater 
emphasis towards incentive-based pay designed to elicit greater commitment and effort. 
Post-war, differentials of 21 percent in 1948 declined almost monotonically to 11 percent 
by 1966.21  What is the pattern of the average hourly earnings piece/time differentials 
over the entire period conditioned by occupation, district and time?  It is obtained as 
follows. The differential of pieceworkers and timeworkers in occupation group i and 
district r at time t is expressed 
 
                                                 
20 From 1914, piecework prices were fixed so that the average pieceworker could expect to earn about one-
third more than the basic time rate.  This was changed to one-quarter above the time rate in 1931.  Other 
complicating factors - for example, interpreting the so-called National Bonus as applied to time and piece 
rates - are explained in Knowles and Hill (1954). These authors also give some explanation as to why the 
differential declined after WWII.   There is a well established market-led literature on why we would 
expect wage differentials in favor of piece rates to result from more able workers self-selecting into and 
enjoying higher earnings than timeworkers (Lazear, 1986; Brown, 1990).  Empircal studies tend to bear out 
these predictions (e.g. Pencavel, 1977; Seiler, 1984). It is not clear the extent to which these national 
guidelines merely  reflected the inevitability of these sorting tendencies or indicated wider considerations.  
It is certainly difficult to square the post-war narrowing of the differentials with this economics literature. 
  
 
21 For most of this period, Knowles and Hill (1954) show corroborating differentials for the two blue-collar 
occupations of fitters and laborers. 
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(8)          irttri
H
irt
P
irt efddyy +++=− loglog       
         
where yP and yH are average hourly earnings (piece-rate and hourly pay, respectively) and 
where di are occupation intercepts, dr are district intercepts22, ft are time intercepts, and 
eirt is an error term.  
 
  
Figure 3 shows plots of estimated time dummies from equation (8) (i.e. )tf
)
 using 
the complete data set.  As background, a plot of the weighted average unemployment rate 
(U) – based on the 29 engineering districts indicated in Table 1 – is also added.  Over the 
Great Depression, the earnings differentials provide a very striking mirror image of the 
superimposed plot of unemployment.  Average hourly earnings based on piece rates fell 
relative to their time rate equivalents during downturns in economic activity and rose 
during upturns.  A steep decline in the differentials coupled with low aggregate 
unemployment rates are clearly the key post-war features. 
 
4 Estimation methodology  
 
Here, I evaluate the effects of separating piece rate and hourly paid workers in 
pay-unemployment relationships.  For comparative purposes, following the majority of 
papers in the relevant literature, I begin by using a single national unemployment rate as a 
measure of the cycle.  I adopt the two-step estimation procedure  of Solon, Barsky and 
                                                 
22 Different geographical engineering districts specialised in different types of engineering activity. For 
example, aircraft and motor vehicle manufacture concentrated in the West Midlands, textile engineering in 
Lancashire and Yorkshire, and marine engineering in the North East Coast of England, North West Coast 
of England and Scotland.  
 
Figure 3 here 
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Parker (1994).  This is designed to tackle the following problem.  Unlike the wages data, 
the national unemployment rate does not differentiate among engineering districts and 
occupational groups.  Across and within districts different occupations may share 
common components of variance that are not captured by the single unemployment rate.  
This may serve to bias downwards the estimated unemployment standard errors 
(Moulton, 1986).   
To illustrate the methodology, take the hourly real earnings changes  of 
pieceworkers (∆ log yP ) in occupation i, within district r, at time t.  Then the step 1 
estimating equation is given by  
(9)    ∑
=
+++=∆
T
t
irtttri
P
irt dy
1
log εχdd  
 
where di and dr are, respectively, sets of occupation and district dummies and where dt is 
a time dummy that is equal to 1 if the observation is from year t.  The estimated 
coefficients on the time dummies, tχˆ  (t = 1,…,T), are regressed in step 2 on the change 
in the unemployment rate, ∆U and a time trend, YEAR: 
 
(10)  .ˆ 21 tttt YEARU νααχ ++∆+=  
 
I estimate (9) by OLS and (10) by weighted least squares (WLS) where the 
weights are the number of individuals represented in each year. The change in the log 
earnings is multiplied by 100.  The estimated coefficient α2 then reflects the percentage 
change in the wage for a one-point change in the unemployment rate.  
This two step estimation procedure is also carried out separately with respect to 
timeworkers’ real basic wage rate (w) and average hourly earnings changes (∆ log yH ) 
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and to the pieceworkers’ and timeworkers weekly average earnings (∆ log YP and ∆ log 
YH, respectively).  Comparable weekly hours regressions (using ∆ log h) are also carried 
out. 
As we have seen from Figure 1, there are large variations in district 
unemployment rates and a natural extension of the foregoing is to disaggregate cyclical 
effects to this level (see also Devereux, 2001).  We still need to make use of the two step 
method because within a given district different occupations may share common 
components of variance that are not captured by the district unemployment rates. 
Again, illustrating with the case of pieceworkers, step 1 is given by 
(11)    ∑∑
= =
++=∆
T
t
R
r
irtrtrti
P
irt udy
1 1
log φd  
 
where drt denotes a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for district r at time t (over 
R districts and T time periods) and uirt is an error term.  
In step 2, estimates of φrt are regressed on the change in district unemployment 
rates (∆Urt) plus district and time intercepts, that is 
 
(12) .ˆ 1 rttrrtrt vUb +++∆= ddφ  
 
Again, OLS is used to estimate (11) and WLS to estimate (12).  The latter is weighted by 
the number of individuals in each district at time t.  
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5 Results 
Table 2 shows the national- and district-level second-stage estimates on the 
change in unemployment – i.e. regression equations (10) and (12) - for the complete 
period, 1926-1966.23  Results using national and district unemployment rates are quite 
similar.  Unsurprisingly, breaking down unemployment into 29 districts reduces the 
standard errors of the estimated unemployment effects.  Concentrating on the district 
results in the lower half of the Table, four features stand out. 
First, while the hourly earnings of both pieceworkers and timeworkers are 
procyclical, the former display significantly larger coefficients than the latter.  For 
pieceworkers, a 1 point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.25 
percent decrease in the hourly earnings.  The comparable earnings reduction for 
timeworkers is 0.09.  Second, the basic wage of hourly paid workers is acyclical.  
Comparing wage and hourly earnings results for this group suggests that hours, and hence 
the fraction of premium (overtime) to total pay, are procyclical.  The third finding 
confirms this expectation.  The hours of both piece rate and hourly paid workers are 
found to be strongly procyclical and not significantly different.  A one point increase in 
the rate of unemployment is associated with a 0.5 percent reduction in weekly hours.  
Fourth, the importance of cyclical hours effects is confirmed, again for both types of 
workers, when weekly earnings replace hourly earnings.  A one point increase in 
unemployment is associated with a 0.76 percent reduction in the weekly earnings of 
                                                 
23 In all reported regressions, I also estimated the second stage entering current and lagged unemployment 
rates separately.  In all cases, the pairs of estimated coefficients were statistically of equal size and opposite 
sign.  This lends support to underlying wage (and hours) curves rather than Phillips curves. 
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pieceworkers and a reduction of 0.63 percent for hourly paid workers, estimates that are 
not significantly different.  
 
 
The results with respect to hourly paid workers in Table 2 are generally in line 
with equivalent results shown by Devereux (2001, Table 2).   The hourly wage is 
acyclical.  Earnings divided by hours are significantly procyclical, albeit with relatively 
modest quantitative importance in the present study.  Weekly earnings display 
significantly greater procyclicality.   Further, Devereux finds that average hourly earnings 
of job stayers receiving incentive pay – defined as “piece rates, commissions, tips and in 
other ways” – are considerably more procyclical than for hourly paid workers.  The 
results in Table 2 give some limited support in this direction too.  Thus, using district 
unemployment rates, the average hourly earnings of pieceworkers display significantly 
larger procyclical effects than those of timeworkers.  But, the estimated pieceworker 
coefficient of -0.25 is considerably smaller than Devereux’s equivalent job stayers’ result 
of -2.17.  
I conjecture in Section 2, based on outcomes from restrictive modelling 
assumptions, that an increase in product price is likely to lead to greater positive earnings 
effects during generally tight labor market conditions. Over the pre-war period from1926 
to 1938, very large employment fluctuations occurred in engineering around a high trend 
in unemployment.  Union utility was strongly affected by changes in employed 
membership with accompanying earnings outcomes less certain. During the post-war 
Tables 2 and 3 here 
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recovery period, while there were both time and cross section unemployment variations, 
the underlying labor market was altogether tighter with far less dramatic employment  
swings.  Under these conditions, it is likely that earnings fluctuations may have been 
more sensitive to demand changes. 
Table 3 presents separate results for the pre- and post-war periods, based on 
district-level unemployment rates.  The pre-war results are not dissimilar from those for 
the full period shown in Table 2. The wage of hourly paid workers is acyclical.  Piece rate 
workers’ hourly earnings are significantly more procyclical than hourly paid workers. 
The weekly hours of both groups are highly procyclical and do not differ from one 
another.  The hours fluctuations are clearly very important since both groups display 
significant and comparable earnings cyclicality. 
In two important respects, the post-war period displays different outcomes.  First, 
the cyclicality of the hourly earnings of hourly paid workers is significantly more 
pronounced that the earlier period (a 10-fold increase).24  Second, hourly earnings 
estimates do not differ statistically between the two payment groups.  As for hours and 
weekly earnings responses, results from the post-war period correspond reasonably 
closely with the pre-war and total-period findings.  Hours and earnings responses are 
strongly procyclical for both groups of workers. In fact, the weekly earnings coefficient 
estimates of about -1.0 are in line with the findings of most micro studies of earnings 
cyclicality that are based on more contemporary data sets. 
 
 
                                                 
24 The estimated post-war wage rate coefficient (-0.33) is also considerably larger than the pre-war 
equivalent.  However, in both cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that estimated coefficients are different 
from zero. 
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6 Conclusions 
Since piece rate systems are geared to rewarding individuals’ current output, it 
seems to be intuitively plausible that, compared to hourly pay, they should be more 
sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in productivity and product demand.  The developments 
in Section 2 lead to the view that, in reality, it is very difficult to discern clear cut cyclical 
earnings differences between the two payments methods.  In fact, in terms of weekly 
earnings, the subsequent empirical analysis finds no differences in earnings responses 
between the two groups.  
In general terms, the findings of this paper lend support to Devereux (2001) who 
argues that it is important to distinguish between different payments measures in studies 
of earnings cyclicality.  As in Devereux’s study, hourly earnings responses are found to 
be less pronounced that those of weekly earnings. Also, it is found in the inter-war period 
that the wage of hourly paid workers is acyclical, average hourly earnings are 
significantly though weakly procyclical, and weekly earnings are far more strongly 
procyclical.  Even in the post-war period, where the wage rate is found to be procyclical, 
weekly earnings are more strongly procyclical than either the wage or hourly earnings. 
An important explanation for these differences across measures derives from the 
underlying strong procyclical fluctuations in paid-for working time.  Of course, we would 
expect more modest hours’ responses in data sets that represent broader cross sections of 
occupations.  Blue collar workers are especially prone to work paid overtime.   
One further point is worth underlining. The findings here point to the possibility 
that cyclical earnings responses will differ according to the relative tightness of the labor 
market around which cyclical payment effects take place.  Some background labor 
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market motivation is presented via firm-union bargaining. Certainly, in the case of hourly 
paid workers, weak wage and hourly earnings responses in the inter-war perod contrast 
with much stronger outcomes in the post war period.  In fact the latter are more in line 
with outcomes from studies using more recent time periods.   
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Table 1  Summary statistics and occupation/district definitions 
 1926 – 1966 1926 – 1938 1951 - 1966 
 Piecework Timework Piecework Timework Piecework Timework 
Mean number of workers per district (standard 
deviation) 
 
721 
(1208) 
 
512 
(1032) 
366 
(600) 
 
342 
(692) 
820 
(1513) 
549 
(1166) 
Percentage pieceworkers to total workers 
 
 
59.0 
 
 
56.4 
 
60.2 
 
Mean percentage difference in piecework and 
timework average hourly earnings 
 
 
25.4 
 
32.0 
 
15.9 
Mean ∆ log (real weekly earnings) 
 
0.025 
(0.052) 
 
0.027 
(0.042) 
 
0.022 
(0.067) 
 
0.028 
(0.052) 
 
0.024 
(0.038) 
 
0.026 
(0.033) 
 
Mean ∆ log (real hourly earnings) 
 
0.024 
(0.033) 
 
0.025 
(0.032) 
 
0.018 
(0.037) 
 
0.024 
(0.041) 
0.032 
(0.028) 
 
0.032 
(0.034) 
 
Engineering Occupations: 
Coppersmiths; Fitters (other than skilled); Fitters (skilled); Toolroom Fitters; Machinemen (rated at or above fitter's rate); 
Machinemen (rated below a fitter's rate); Machine Moulders (at or above moulder's rate); Machine Moulders (below a moulder's 
rate); Moulding Machine Operators; Moulders (loose pattern); Patternmakers;  Platers/Riveters/Caulkers; Sheet Metal Workers; 
Turners; Labourers 
 
Engineering Districts: 
Aberdeen; Bedford; Birmingham; Blackburn; Bolton; Burnley; Burton; Coventry; Derby; Dundee; Halifax; Hull; Leicester; 
Lincoln; Liverpool; London; Manchester; North East Coast; Northern Ireland; North Staffs; North West; Nottingham; Oldham; 
Preston; Rochdale; St. Helens; Sheffield; West of England; Wigan 
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Table 2  National and district unemployment change effects on real wages, real earnings and hours: 
1926 - 1966  (Weighted Least Squares) 
 
 
Using national unemployment rate 
 
 Piece rate pay  
 
Hourly pay  
 
Significant 
difference? 
 
Hourly earnings  
 
-0.30 
(0.18) 
 
-0.06 
(0.21) 
 
No 
Hourly wage   
 
- 
 
0.10 
(0.19) 
 
- 
Weekly hours 
 
 
-0.69** 
(0.23) 
-0.88** 
(0.25) 
No 
Weekly earnings 
 
-1.00** 
(0.32) 
 
-0.94* 
(0.39) 
 
No 
Observations first-stage (second- 
stage) 
 
3573 (23) 3904 (23)  
 
Using district unemployment rates 
 
 Piece rate pay  
 
Hourly pay  
 
Significant 
difference? 
 
Hourly earnings  
 
 
-0.25** 
(0.06) 
-0.09* 
(0.04) 
 
Yes 
Hourly wage - -0.01 
(0.04) 
 
 
- 
Weekly hours 
 
 
-0.51** 
(0.16) 
-0.54** 
(0.13) 
No 
Weekly earnings 
 
-0.76** 
(0.18) 
 
-0.63** 
(0.13) 
 
No 
Observations first-stage (second- 
stage) 
 
3573 (585) 3914 (611)  
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. 
             ** (*) denotes two-tail significance at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
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Table 3  District unemployment change effects on real wages, real earnings and hours: pre- and post-
war periods (Weighted Least Squares) 
 
 
Pre-war (1926 – 1938) 
 
 Piece rate pay  
 
Hourly pay  
 
Significant 
difference? 
Hourly earnings  
 
-0.29** 
(0.06) 
 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
 
Yes 
Hourly wage   
 
- 
 
 
0.002 
(0.03) 
 
- 
Weekly hours 
 
 
-0.43* 
(0.20) 
 
-0.51** 
(0.14) 
No 
Weekly earnings 
 
-0.72** 
(0.22) 
 
-0.56** 
(0.14) 
 
No 
Observations first-stage (second- 
stage) 
 
1908 (312) 2095 (333)  
 
Post-war (1951 – 1966) 
 
 Piece rate pay  
 
Hourly pay  
 
Significant 
difference? 
Hourly earnings  
 
 
-0.29 
(0.22) 
 
-0.52* 
(0.22) 
 
No 
Hourly wage - 
 
 
-0.33 
(0.20) 
 
- 
Weekly hours 
 
 
-0.92** 
(0.27) 
-0.46* 
(0.22) 
No 
Weekly earnings 
 
-1.21** 
(0.38) 
 
-0.99** 
(0.35) 
 
No 
Observations first-stage (second- 
stage) 
 
2055 (286) 2113 (286)  
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. 
             ** (*) denotes two-tail significance at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
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Figure 1  Unemployment rates in selected engineering districts, 1926-1966
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Figure 2 Proportion of piece rate to total workers, 1926-1966
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Figure 3 Piecework-timework differentials in hourly earnings and unemployment
 1926-1965
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